List of sentences containing uncertainty words in the answer section, by negations

{'any (38)', 'no (19)', 'nothing (2)'}

The reasoning is as simple as that: I have nothing else to add at this stage and I have no information regarding any message which may be addressed to us.

{'any (38)', 'no (19)'}

At this stage there has been no discussion with executive branches as regards any help or any guarantees or any support that could be given.

{'any (38)', 'nobody (5)'}

As regards the alertness of the ECB, I think that nobody has any doubts about our alertness.

{'any (38)', 'not (119)', 'nobody (5)'}

It 's quite interesting that until a month ago, nobody had any doubt that public debt, sovereign debt in the euro area, was actually very, very big, and now some people worry that we wo n't have enough bonds.

{'any (38)', 'not (119)'}

One of the points of discussion is how we best react to any increase in volatility, not caused by our own actions, but by something else that is happening in the rest of the world.

As regards your second question on our forecast at this stage, I would not change in any respect the predictions that we made last time.

On the other hand, all the indications we have given - and I will repeat them again today - are such that I believe that there can not be any doubt in anybody 's mind as to the direction in which the next move will go.

I do n't want to suggest that we will take any new decisions at this stage.

So these are the facts, and any speculation concerning possible choices is unfounded because decisions have not yet been taken and the revised plans have not yet been assessed.

We also have to recognise, even if we do not have any other objective possibilities but to take future prices in account that these future prices are not a good predictor.

I will not embark on any kind of assumption on" what happens if '', because I am working on the assumption that the right decisions will be taken, not the wrong.

We do not exclude the possibility that such an impact could come, so we have again, in this domain as well as in others, to remain ready to incorporate any new information.

So one should n't have any doubt that the Governing Council in its collective wisdom not only has the power, the willingness and the determination, but also the cohesion that 's necessary to take the actions that are needed.

As regards what the United States might or might not ask, we will see when we participate in the meeting, but again, I do not want to anticipate in any respect what we will do, or what the British Presidency will do, I will only say that the present global consensus -- and it has been expressed several times before now -- is that we all have homework to do.

The size of the increase - I do not know how you want to qualify it - but you should not see it as a bias in any direction you might think of.

So that 's why there should n't be any doubt about doing structural reforms.

First question -- we will see what will be in our next projections, and I do not want to anticipate in any respect the next projections -- they depend on a number of parameters and on the work that will be done by our staff.

I can not think of any factor that could undermine this strong currency.

We have n't seen really any redenomination of risk.

We are members of a 17-country euro area, so it is especially important that any modifications we introduce do not put at risk or call into question the independence of the members of the Governing Council.

We are free to do what we would judge appropriate when the time comes, but at the present moment, I do n't want to comment any more on probabilities.

So there should n't be any doubt about that, and we have plenty of instruments, as you know.

I believe I should not make any comment that could be interpreted in any way as influencing decisions.

It is a very professional exercise and I do not want to prejudge in any respect what could be produced.

That is why I say that there can not be any doubt in anybody 's mind as to the direction of future monetary policy.

{'any (38)', 'without (3)'}

I have been clear since the very first press conference on the ECB 's conditions for accepting this task -- namely that it should be in a position to carry it out in a decisive, firm, complete and strong manner without any reputational risks.

The whole plan will be implemented in an orderly fashion without creating any turbulence in Greece as a result of this process.

{'any (38)'}

Any proposals that could emerge from the EU Council will certainly be examined very carefully by us, with the idea that we can improve things.

To your first question: any indications that could be given in respect of a possible weakening of the fiscal consolidation would be against, I repeat, against the decisions that have been taken by the various governments themselves, against the recommendations and decisions that have been taken within the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact upon the proposal of the Commission and against the Berlin Agreement I referred to in the introductory remarks.

Have we seen any of these risks materialise?

For that reason, Sveriges Riksbank has to have adequate capital and reserves to absorb all shocks that any central bank might face.

All elements have to be taken into account and, as you know, at any time there might be changes.

That 's the most important thing that we can do today, to preserve the solvency and the robustness of the Greek banking system, and also to this extent, the ECB has asked the Eurogroup members to make sure that the recapitalisation fund of something around $ 10 billion be readily available to face any sudden negative contingency that might materialise.

So any conclusion you might want to draw already today is certainly premature.

We are in the happy position where the Eurosystem as such holds so much foreign currency reserves that it will at all times be equipped to meet any disaster which might loom on the horizon.

{'few (6)'}

At the same time, we have the rest of the world, and we have these effects that we 've observed over the last few weeks -- perhaps more than a few weeks ; especially in the last few weeks -- so we 'll have to see whether these effects are transitory or are permanent.

{'less (6)'}

Therefore, where competition is less, prices may rise more.

As far as we understand, it is the consequence of the decision of the banks themselves at the moment of the renewal of their previous financing to ask for less than they could have done.

{'little (6)', 'less (6)'}

You have noticed for instance that the services sector PMI was a little bit better than anticipated in April, that the European Commission 's service confidence indicator was a little bit less flattering than anticipated, and that consumer confidence in March was unchanged.

{'little (6)'}

I wish as little uncertainty as possible.

That 's what we are talking about ; some of them are a little more confident perhaps because they live in jurisdictions where inflation and developments are a little more encouraging, or the labour market conditions are tighter.

You know the figures, and I have to say that part of the sentiment which is a little bit better might come from these facts that I have just mentioned.

{'never (3)', 'not (119)'}

But it 's a question of probability ; it 's never a question of 100% certainty and I do not exclude the possibility that we could surprise the market.

We have already said it 100 times, namely that the Monthly Bulletin, which is issued approximately one week after the Statement of the President, i.e. a statement of the kind the President has just made, is not sending and will never send messages differing from that in the Introductory Statement.

{'never (3)'}

But I will never exclude that sometime this year, or next year, we will use it.

{'no (19)', 'not (119)', 'few (6)'}

No, we could not, Mr. Barber, because the German Government has now finalised its draft law on the Deutsche Bundesbank, on the structure of the Bundesbank itself, but has postponed for a few months bringing the draft law on banking supervision or" Allfinanz '' supervision to the Cabinet - and subsequently to the Parliament, after having received advice on that from the ECB.

{'no (19)'}

We feel no need to revise our own intentions or targets.

Just going back also to -- well, it 's partly related to that ; going back to the previous question as well: you see, the difference in June is that in June there was no need to revise downward our projections at all.

The yo-yo - no - the volatility is very high, even in the course of a trading day.

So from today 's standpoint there is no reason to deviate from the indications we have been consistently providing in the introductory statement to this press conference.

So this angst so far has no evidence that could justify it.

No, it could be a signal that markets have to listen more to me than to others.

We still think that it is the valid picture, as published in the June Monthly Bulletin, and we have no reason to deviate from it.

But there was no way we could technically resolve the problem in its entirety, in other words avoid an increase in the interest rate, unless we had been active on a daily basis in the market by way of fine tuning operations.

I would only like to add that at the end of the year there will be a number of operations that are possible today which will no longer be possible.

But if a risk materialises, it is no longer a risk !

The actual indications are that we see no reasons to differ substantially from the European Commission 's forecast.

So, I would point out that the European Commission also forecasts average inflation in 2000 and 2001 to be 1.5%, and we see no reason to deviate from that forecast.

So, one has no reason to doubt the commitment of the government.

{'nobody (5)'}

Nobody knows what might happen in the near future.

Nobody would have believed.

{'not (119)', 'few (6)'}

As for your third question as to whether the sale of our interest income from foreign exchange has something to do with pressure from financial circles or finance ministers to start interventions, I should like to point out that I can not imagine that you can conclude that the fact that these pressures were there is something of the last few days or maybe the last week.

{'not (119)', 'less (6)'}

So this does n't mean that risk perception has disappeared ; risk perception is there, but its effect on tightening is considerably less than it was before.

Well, I shall let you judge whether I am addressing recent events or less recent events when I say that we do not like excessive volatility on the exchange markets.

So I do not exclude the possibility that some changes will be proposed in order to be less procyclical.

{'not (119)', 'no (19)'}

The answer is no, we do n't see a risk of scarcity, and we have not discussed other measures.

And thus far I have no reason to believe that it is not being implemented rigorously.

And to the second question: no there is n't such a risk, because we announced about the interest rates that they would be for all practical purposes at the lower bound, but technical adjustments could be possible, and that 's what we did.

{'not (119)', 'nobody (5)'}

But I would not qualify the probability of realisation ; and, to my knowledge, nobody does that, because, if I speak the language of economists and mathematicians, I would say that there is clearly an element of Knightian uncertainty in what can happen to this domain.

{'not (119)'}

We will examine the situation very carefully and we will, in our next meeting, not exclude the possibility of increasing rates by a small amount.

I have been invited by Jean-Claude Juncker to participate in the Eurogroup meeting and I do not want to predict what will be said there.

And the dynamism of M3 is partly due to the fact that this yield curve is flat and that a large proportion of investors are not taking the risk to be longer.

I do n't want to speculate what are the conditions whereby countries would not receive the assistance of the ECB.

We do expect a continuation of market volatility, certainly until the referendum ; I do n't want to speculate about the outcome of the referendum, but probably even after the referendum.

So our position -- which has also been discussed in the macroprudential forum where we have the Governing Council and the Supervisory Board at the same time -- our position has been that first, there is reason to change the present system of zero risk weights ; second, that the revision should not create undue turbulence in markets where sovereign debt is used, like for instance the repo market and in general short-term money markets ; and third, that it should be a change in the international standard, meaning, coming out of the Basel Committee discussion -- a principle, by the way, that is also mentioned in the Five Presidents ' Report: that annual revision of the sovereign debt risk weight regime should be decided in an international context to ensure a level playing field.

Then we decided that we would not share the risk arising from this type of bond but that each NCB should bear the risk of accepting these bonds.

But sometimes not, and sometimes foreign central banks even make it public themselves.

I do n't exclude the possibility that in the latest review of growth potential for various European economies and for the euro area as a whole, for the European Union as a whole, we might discover that the consensus of economists goes in the direction of revising down previous estimates.

Some of them would say that they are in a situation which is difficult and would ask for help, while others would say that they are in a situation which is solid and strong and resilient and they should not all be confused.

It is not good to suggest that some are in such a weak situation that you would amend the rules for the sake of that situation.

But it is not the case, precisely because everybody knows that we are fiercely independent and that there is not the slightest doubt that we decide in this totally independent way.

And third, as you know, we do not compare the risks to price stability with the risks to the economy, and we do n't weigh these risks against each other.

It objected to extending ELA to non-viable banks and thus did not replace what could have been fiscal action.

Now, on the other point, I do n't want to speculate.

On the second question, one reason why banks do not lend is risk aversion, which is both micro, with respect to their clients, and macro, with respect to the general economic environment and the high uncertainty that still prevails in some parts of the euro area.

That being said, I do not want to anticipate the meeting which will take place next Monday at the level of the Eurogroup.

As regards what will be said at the next meeting of the Eurogroup, I do not want to anticipate ; it is a meeting of the Eurogroup and it will depend very much on what will be said by the various delegations -- not by only one, but by the various delegations that will present their own situations and intentions.

I do not want to anticipate the conclusion which will be drawn following the proposal of the Commission by Jean-Claude Juncker as Chairman of the Eurogroup.

I would certainly hope so, but I do not want to anticipate our own projections, so we will see what our own projections are.

At this stage, I would only say that we do not exclude the possibility that we could have a profile next year which would be slightly different.

And we have particular difficult - as you know - because the futures market for instance is not a good predictor.

And in this climate of general uncertainty, not necessarily economic uncertainty but probably mostly geopolitical uncertainty, it 's very important that a message of stability comes out of the G20.

I am not going to speculate about a potential recession if we do not see one coming.

Our duty is to give the markets not what you seem to be hinting at: it is to give them the clearest explanation of what our reaction function is.

Since, as you know, the strategy has not changed but merely been clarified, this decision would also have been taken had we not made this clarification public.

If we make exception for what 's happening in the United States between market correction, statements, various statements on trade and other issues, you would agree you do n't see much volatility in our financial markets in the eurozone.

On the first and we were always -- and it goes back in tradition -- not to discuss risks about inflation.

But, at this point in time, we do not see these risks and we see all the factors that have led us to express this new forward guidance.

We are not over-interpreting these results and we should not declare victory, but certainly they do not confirm or suggest that we could have a credit crunch.

Not only a risk for prices.

As you know well, what you observe in Germany in the real estate market is not what you might observe in other countries such as Spain or anywhere else in Europe.

As I said, we do not see these risks now in the euro area.

In spite of that, frankly, we do not see the risks of deflation as having increased with respect to our assessment, which basically says that these risks are limited on both sides.

I do not see that risk at all.

I said already that I did not exclude other possible non-standard measures.

So you have to have an interval of time that is such that the published account does n't actually create confusion with respect to the decisions that have been taken and does n't create confusion in the expectations about the decisions that will or might be taken in the future.

And I am not inclined to speculate on the impact.

It depends on many parameters, and at this point, certainly we would n't want to speculate on precise deadlines.

I just do n't want to speculate, giving horizons of dates, of deadlines.

As I have said, this is a fully effective backstop removing tail risk for Europe, and I would not want to speculate on other measures for the time being at least.

So I do not want to anticipate a decision which is a very important one and will be made at the appropriate level, namely at the level of Heads of States and Governments.

Now, let me make absolutely clear that we wo n't tolerate prolonged deviations from price stability, and the main reason is that if these deviations feed into inflation expectations, they 'll cause a drop on medium to long-term inflation expectations, which by the way still are within a range consistent with medium-term price stability.

So, a very significant reduction, and that is part of the overall sentiment that we have that not only upside risks to price stability have been alleviated but there has also been a significant regaining of control of inflation expectations, which is very important.

But I do not want to anticipate what our staff will present next time.

The speed limit itself has to be elevated and that is why we always mention structural reforms as being of the essence Thanks to our own mandate of price stability and to the extent that we deliver price stability, we have a very important responsibility in permitting growth to be as close as possible to the speed limit and not to be volatile ; in avoiding the stops and goes that are associated with inflation.

And then I -- and I should say we -- can not and did not want to speculate on how the events will evolve once a war breaks out.

We will announce the exact technical details later on, but this is not to be confused with the SMP.

On the second question, we do not balance the risks to the real economy and the risks to price stability to make a judgement of which risk is more important.

I would not dare to give a precise figure, but you can not simply base assumptions on the difference between the actual outcome of M3 at the end of 1999 and the reference value, because there were special factors at the beginning of the year.

I have already mentioned the fact that we do not like excessive volatility and turbulence in general and that we had a stake in stability and stability in the exchange market as well as financial stability in general.

I do not want to speculate again about the possibility that inflation on average might turn out higher than 2%.

Again, the fact that we use the additional credit claims as a further way to provide collateral means that we have now addressed the funding issues -- we can not address the shortage of capital and we can not address the risk aversion that has indeed reached high levels.

Of course, the collateral they give should be acceptable and should not increase the risk of the balance sheets of the ECB.

It is not a good predictor for inflation tomorrow.

It is also clear that a small group, a small oligopolistic structure, is not what is probably desirable at the level of global finance.

I can not quantify that uncertainty over a period of time.

Again, I do n't want to speculate on this.

I do n't want to speculate on the likelihood of these events.

On the rest, I do n't want to speculate really.

If you eliminate all those prices that are pushed up and maintain in your understanding of inflation those which are pushed down, perhaps it is not fair ; perhaps it is better for demand-driven change in relative prices to look at the full picture and not only at part of the picture.

So, what we publish does not confirm your assumptions.

I do n't want to predict what is likely or not likely to be decided tomorrow by the European Commission.

However, there are a lot of cases where core inflation is not a good predictor.

I do n't exclude that possibility at all ; we may even be lower, perhaps.

{'nothing (2)', 'few (6)'}

But we have in the first place to compare that with the alternative of doing nothing and what could happen to the fiscal situation of those countries that would lead in a few years ' time to programmes that would have to be much harsher, much stricter, with all the consequences that that would have.

{'without (3)'}

But from this perspective, the recovery has, to date, been confirmed without too much doubt.